Despite being vulnerable to attacks from sea by terror groups, India has not yet adopted any comprehensive measures to prevent the possibilities of proliferation of nuclear weapons through containers. In spite of 26/11 Mumbai attack from sea route and Navy chief warning over smuggling of dirty nuclear bombs or other WMD’s by terrorists through containers, government is still indecisive about joining the US-led Container Security Initiative (CSI) or develop any other alternatives to secure the ports.

Half a decade after the initiative (CSI) was launched and India being invited to participate, New Delhi is yet to take a call on this. Many countries which were perceivably less susceptible to terrorist attacks have realized the importance of CSI and promptly joined it. Even China found merit in the CSI and joined it formally in July 2003. About Fifty eight ports in more than 30 countries are currently CSI compliant. If the Union Cabinet decides to join the initiative, it would enable Mumbai’s Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) to become the first port in the country to be CSI-compliant.

With high economic stakes relying on growth of Indian exports, India cannot afford to ignore security threats to its maritime infrastructure. Considering the huge export growth potential of India, it is essential that all major ports of India go for CSI-type scanning and monitoring facilities. At present 12 major ports and about 200 minor and intermediate ports in India are handling more than 90% volume of the trade in India, most of them with tardy security procedures.  There is an urgent necessity to install equipment to scan containers to examine hidden compartments and check containers without unloading them. 
Certainly, the CSI will provide double benefits as the equipment will also be available for Indian agencies to screen incoming containers. In fact, only about 15 percent container traffic from JNPT is headed for the American ports, so the facility could prove to be helpful for Indian investigative agencies like the Director of Revenue Intelligence.

The Initiative may have been envisaged to cater for US security requirements. But in many ways it bears dividends for all CSI participants.  India’s willingness to join CSI is favourable not only in terms of security but also makes commercial sense. Joining the CSI has dual benefits; firstly, it will ensure smooth trade with US as containers from CSI ports will get preference. Secondly, CSI would bring an array of advanced security machinery which would be beneficial to our port security infrastructure.

New Delhi has had reservations over the Initiative’s functioning which enables US officials to be posted in foreign ports. Indian customs officials feel there would be a clash of jurisdiction while there are skeptics in the security establishment who also feel presence of foreign officials at sensitive Indian maritime facilities would affect the country’s sovereignty. Now, Washington is ready to consider India’s demand for posting of its own customs officials at American ports. Canada and Japan are the only two countries to have exercised this right with the US. Without delay New Delhi needs to elucidate this apprehension through discussion with Washington. 

Similarly, significant internal debate is currently on within the Indian establishment on the merits and demerits of joining the US-led proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI). The PSI was formed on May 31, 2003 to create and enhance global cooperation and partnerships in interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials.

The PSI seeks to enhance mutual cooperation among member states to curtail trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the seas, in the air and on the ground.  In India, many arguments have been raised against joining the PSI. It has been argued that the PSI is not a UN sanctioned anti-proliferation initiative and therefore not an international legal instrument, PSI member countries are exclusively from NATO, ANZUS and US Mutual Defence Pact countries, and Indian Navy and India Air Force assets deployed in PSI procedure of interdiction and interception would lead to wearing out and material degradation of military assets. Similarly, critics feel that PSI is aimed at countries like Iran with which India has history of strong political relations. Another criticism is that even China, which is a UN Security Council member has not yet subscribed to the PSI.

 An issue of primary concern was PSI’s doubtful equitability, particularly in terms of access of intelligence, if India is not a member of the core group. Responding to India’s concerns, the Bush Administration decided to dismantle the Initiative’s core group in 2005. India’s ambiguity towards the PSI was also partly influenced by the Russian opposition in May 2003. But surprisingly, Moscow joined the initiative a year later.  

Participation in PSI would lead India into broad political obligations but not generate legal commitments. This may dilute its effectiveness as a counter proliferation mechanism, but will offer some assured advantages for its participants. Flexibility to act on a case-to-case basis, in pursuit of national policies and strategic interests is an added advantage of this Initiative.

The PSI and the CSI are complementary in that both are operational efforts in support of national security objectives to enhance global maritime security by improving our ability to prevent risky shipments. Besides, in the current security scenario, these initiatives have emerged as key instruments to deal with rising threat from WMD terrorism.

Dr. Amit Kumar is Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He can be contacted at amitkumar@orfonline.org.