Despite Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s repeated assurances that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe there are serious apprehensions in India that it may fall into the wrong hands. We need to see a more realistic perspective. From what we know, there is assured, inherent safety in the separation and physical storage of the three major components of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (vector, warhead and trigger) and the Army’s senior leadership has tight control over them. Our more immediate security concern ought to be Pakistan’s inability to exercise full constitutional authority and maintain order, particularly over areas dominated by the Taliban.

It is axiomatic that Pakistan’s power centre is not its political leadership but the Army; the glue that has held Pakistan together through its many crises. There are, however, indications that all may not be well with that last bastion. Pakistan Army’s weak posturing juxtaposed with Taliban’s increasing assertiveness does not reflect a strong professional army that is geared for battle against irregular forces. Conversely, Taliban has been sending strong signals of its ability to strike at will; the many attacks from Lal Masjid episode to the recent attacks in Lahore bear testimony. Even Taliban’s current withdrawal from Buner may be only a tactical pause; it is believed that many ‘cells’ are being left behind to spring to life at short notice.

Unspoken suspicion hovers around the existence of more than a little sympathy within the rank and file of the Army for some of Taliban’s Islamic edicts. The Islamisation of the Army initiated by Zia has had significant impact. Apparent dilution of Islamic values by years of close association between senior Army officers and the US has caused some misgivings among middle piece leadership and other ranks especially amid those who hail from semi-urban, rural areas. What if that causes fissures within the edifice of the Army, particularly when (not ‘if’) confronted with the prospects of launching counter-terrorist operations in Punjab?

The US ‘Af-Pak’ strategy is narrowly focussed on its self interests. It could be the first step in its disengagement from the region. Obama’s first priority would be to show results within the first two years of his presidency. If and when the US leaves, what would Pakistan do? If Pakistan Army defeats the Taliban, could it be emboldened to resume its obsession with Kashmir with renewed arrogance just like that after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan? Worse, if the Army cannot defeat the Taliban and instead concedes to some ‘working arrangement’ again, will it unleash the Taliban against India as it did using the raiders in 1947? In either event, it is Hobson’s choice for India.

If Taliban’s goal is the total Islamisation of the world, could India be its next phase objective?  It is in that context that we may have to worry about the control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. For now, we need to worry more about the immediate problems and strengthen ourselves for contingencies without banking on any outside powers to come to our help.